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1962] RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-INSANITY-THE TEST OF CRIMINAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS-For the second time this court saved the defendant
from paying the penalty for his crime which two juries found
was not the product of a diseased or defective mind' but was
murder in the first degree.2 In the instant appeal the United
States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, held,
two judges dissenting, that the giving of an instruction which
improperly placed the burden of proof on the defendant of
establishing his defense of insanity was reversible error, even
though the instruction came between two instructions which
properly imposed the burden on the prosecution to establish
that the defendant was sane. Blocker v. United States, 288
F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1961)
In criminal law "insanity", by whatever test it may be as-
certained, may be said to be that degree or quantity of mental
disorder which relieves one of the criminal responsibility for
his actions.3 A variety of standards have been formulated to
determine criminal responsibility in connection with persons
suffering from a mental condition. These are the M'Naughten
rule,4 the M'Naughten rule accompanied by the irresistible im-
pulse test,5 the New Hampshire 6 or Durham test,7 and the test
1. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). (This is the
Durham rule of criminal responsibility applied in the District of Colum-
bia.)
2. Blocker v. United States, 274 F.2d 572 (D.C. Cir. 1959). (The first
reversal was gained solely because of a change of opinion by psychiatrists,
who had not been witnesses in the case, as to what constitutes mental
disease. It was held that their testimony in other cases constituted new
evidence.) See testimony in Rosenfield v. Overholser, 157 F. Supp. 18 (1959).
3. Sollars v. State, 73 Nev. 248, 316 P.2d 917, 919 (1957).
4. M'Naughten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). The rule is: ".... to
establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused waslaboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not
to know the nature and quality of the act which he was doing; or, if he
did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." This
rule is followed by approximately thirty states without addition or modifi-
cation. See American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, Appendix A § 4.01(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955), hereinafter cited as Model Penal Code. (This
rule is also known as the 'right and wrong' test).
5. United States v. Gundelfinger, 102 F. Supp. 177 (1952); Flowers v.State, 139 N.E.2d 185 (Ind. 1956). This rule is always coupled with the
M'Naughten test and includes that where the defendant knew the nature
of his act and the right and wrong of it, he will be excused if his insanity
prevented him from controlling his acts. See Pollard v. United States, 285
F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1960); and United States ex rel. Wing v. Commonwealth,
90 F. Supp. 208 (1950). This rule is followed by approximately thirteen
states. See Model Penal Code, Appendix A, § 4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
But. it has been rejected by many jurisdictions. See People v. Nash, 338
P.2d 416 (Cal. 1959); State v. Simenson, 262 N.W. 638 (Minn. 1935); State
v. Goza, 317 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1958); Fisher v. State, 47 N.W.2d 349 (Neb.
1951); State v. Wallace, 131 P.2d 222 (Ore. 1942); Freeman v. State, 317
S.W.2d 736 (Tex. 1958); Simecek v. State, 10 N.W.2d 161 (Wis. 1943).
6. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870). The rule is: .. . . . . the verdict
should be not guilty by reason of insanity if the killing was the offspring
or product of mental disease in the defendant .. "
7. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-5 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The
rule is: " ... .an aocused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act
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of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code." The Model
Penal Code test has been accepted in essence by the third cir-
cuit in a recent case. 9 This case represents the second judicial
repudiation in this century with regard to the M'Naughten
test, the first being the famed Durham decision.
Where insanity is pleaded as a defense the burden of proof
will lie either with the prosecution' ° or the defense"- as the
rule of the particular jurisdiction dictates. There are four
alternative variations of these standards which center around
the degree of proof required. They are: 1) the prosecution
must establish sanity beyond a reasonable doubt,1 2) the
prosecution must establish sanity by a preponderance of the
evidence, 13 3) the defense must establish insanity beyond a
reasonable doubt, 14 and, 4) the defense must establish insanity
by the preponderance of the evidence. 5 The burden of proof
appears not to have been assigned nor the quantum of evidence
established by statute or by the courts of only two states. "
was the product of mental disease or mental defect." This rule is only
followed by the District of Columbia and New Hampshire and is also
known as the 'products test'. But, it has been rejected by other jurisdic-
tions. See Anderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1956); Howard
v. United States, 232 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1954); People v. Ryan, 295 P.2d 496(Colo. 1956); State v. Kitchens, 286 P.2d 1079 (Mont. 1955); State v. Collins,
314 P.2d 660 (Wash. 1960).
8. Model Penal Code § 4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). The test is: "A
person is not responsible for crimnial conduct if at the time of such con-
duct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his con-
duct to the requirements of law." (This test as adopted by Vermont differs
only in that it substitutes the term "adequate" for the word "substantial"
in the phrase "substantial capacity" and the addition of the sentence, "The
terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality manifested
only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct. The terms
'mental disease or defect' shall include congenital and traumatic mental
conditions as well as diseases.")
9. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3rd Cir. 1961).
10. United States v. Davis, 160 U.S. 469 (1895); Holloway v. United States,
148 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Limp v. State, 228 Ind. 361, 92 N.E.2d 549(1950); People v. Eggelston, 186 Mich. 510, 152 N.W. 944 (1915); Fisher v.
State, 140 Neb. 216, 299 N.W. 501 (1941).
11. People v. Harmon, 110 Cal. App. 2d 545, 243 P.2d 15 (1953); State v.
Bruntlett, 240 Ia. 338, 36 N.W.2d 450 (1949); State v. De Haan, 88 Mont. 407,
292 Pac. 1109 (1930); State v. Leland, 190 Ore. 598, 227 P.2d 785 (1951);
Wenck v. State, 238 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Crim. 1951).
12. United States v. Davis, 160 U.S. 469 (1895); Martz v. People, 114 Colo.
278, 162 P.2d 408 (1945); Holloway v. JTnited States, 148 F.2d 665, (1945);
People v. Eggleston, 186 Mich. 510, 152 N.W. 944 (1915) (New York or
Federal rule).
13. People v. Nino, 149 N.Y. 317, 43 N.E. 853 (1896); overruled by People
v. Egnor, 175 N.Y. 419, 67 N.E. 906 (1903). (This rule has been followed
very little, but would seem to have a good deal of merit if it were used
with a test of criminal responsibility other than M'Naughten.).
14. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 136-390 (1955); see Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790(1952), affirming 190 Ore. 598, 227 P.2d 785 (1951). (The Supreme Court
held that due process does not guarantee any particular allocation of the
burden of proof on the issue of criminal responsibility.) However, Oregon
has amended its statute to require only a preponderance of the evidence
by the defendant. See Ore. Rev. Stat. § 136-390 (1959).
15. People v. Harmon, 110 Cal. App. 2d 545, 253 P.2d 15 (1953); State v.
Bruntlett, 240 Ia. 338, 36 N.W.2d 450 (1949); State v. DeHaan, 88 Mont.
407, 292 Pac. 1109 (1930); Wenck v. State, 238 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Crim. 1951).
16. North Dakota and South Dakota.
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The test of criminal responsibility and the burden of per-
suasion" are intrinsically involved with the problem of jury
instruction. In the instant case the jury was charged in ac-
cordance with the Durham test of criminal responsibility 8
and the burden of persuasion was on the prosecution to prove
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. 1
As to the latter the majority held that the instructions re-
sulted in confusion solely on the basis of judicial construction.
However, the court cited no authority to substantiate the
proposition that any one portion of a charge may be con-
strued so as to constitute prejudicial error. In opposition, there
is strong authority to the effect that it is axiomatic that the
charge to the jury be considered as a whole. 21 Also, it is sub-
mitted that hypercritical scrutiny of every statement in a
charge, when considered alone, would practically always reveal
dual meanings."2 Therefore, as stated by the dissent in the
present case,2 3 the thoroughly established principle of consid-
ering a charge as a whole 24 and in connection with what pre-
cedes and follows the challenged portion2- has completely been
disregarded.
The question of criminal responsibility is perhaps the most
controversial problem existing in the criminal law today.' 6 The
existing problem is formulating a test enabling the courts to
17. The burden consists of two elements: (1) the Initial burden of going
forward with the evidence (always on the defendant) and (2) the burden of
persuasion (which we are presently concerned with).
18. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
19. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895). (This is the Federal rule).
20. Excerpt from instruction (1) "Basically, there is a presumption that
all people are sane. But, when there is some evidence of a mental disorder,
as here in this case, then the presumption of sanity of the individual . . .
vanishes from the case. The burden is then upon the Government to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time in question . . . the defendant
was of sound mind .. " (It is pointed out that here, where the burden
Is on the state to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt the test of in-
sanity seems also to be very liberal. This should be kept in mind when
reading this writer's conclusions). (The first portion of the charge is
correct).
Excerpt from instruction (2) "if you find that the defendant was
suffering from a mental disease or defect, and if you find that the defend-
ant did in fact commit such acts, then you must find that it resulted from
or was produced by the unsoundness, or by the mental illness. Now, if
you find that then you may find the defendant not guilty by reason ofInsanity." (This portion of the charge was considered erroneous In part
by the majority of this court).
Excerpt from instruction (3) "Now, ladies and getlemen, it should be
crystal clear to you that when some evidence is introduced to you thepresumption of sanity disappears and the responsibility from that point
on is on the Government." (This portion of the charge, being last, and theInstructions read as a whole would seem to point out that the burden Is
on the Government).
21. Kinard v. United States, 101 F.2d 246, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
22. See Stoneking v. United States, 232 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
23. Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853. 875 (D.C. Cir. 1961).24. Myers v. United States, 18 F.2d 529, 530 (8th Cir. 1927).
25. Boyd v. United States, 271 U.S. 104 (1926).
26. See Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640, 644 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. den,
354 U.S. 940 (1957).
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discriminate between cases whereby the proper disposition
would either result in penal-institutionalization or medical-
custody whichever best benefits society and the individual
defendant.27
Presently, North Dakota labors under a form of the M'-
Naughten rule as its test of criminal responsibility.2 8 This
writer recommends the adoption of some form of the Model
Penal Code standard in that it broadens the class of persons
who could be hospitalized rather than imprisoned because this
test permits cognizance of modern medical views of mental
disease and defects prohibited by M'Naughten. Also, at the
time of this writing, North Dakota has not judicially or by
statute assigned the burden of proof nor the quantum of evi-
dence and it is an open question. The alternative of assigning
the burden to the prosecution but reducing the weight of the
evidence to a preponderance rather than beyond a reasonable
doubt would seem to reconcile conflicting views29 and adapt
itself to the recommended test of criminal responsibility. Pol-
icy considerations of the courts of our state could readily be
effected in the jury instructions using these standards.
My views are based on the proposition that in a criminal
prosecution it is for the state to prove all the necessary ele-
ments of the crime including mens rea. Sanity is a prerequi-
site to criminal intent. Thus, placing the burden on the state
does not constitute an undue hardship because of the facili-
ties available to it and for substantial policy reasons of fair-
ness to the defendant. It is pointed out that there is a great
split of authority on this point with the opposition making the
defense of insanity an affirmative defense with the burden of
proof on the defendant at all times. Although being logical,
this concept seems to contravene sound policy and violate in-
dividual rights of the defendant by forcing him to prove or
disprove an essential element of the prosecution's case; name-
ly, mens rea. It is felt that a defendant, in an action of this
type, is entitled to every protection which the law can afford
him.
RONALD G. SCHMIDT
27. Model Penal Code, § 4.01, comments at 156.
28. See State v. Throndson, 191 N.W. 628 (N.D. 1932).
29. See State v. Barton, 361 Mo. 780, 236 S.W.2d 596 (1951).
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